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In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008) cheaper, softer money flooded the worldwide 
markets.  Faced with historically low capital costs, the pharmaceutical industry chose to pay down 
debt through share buy-backs rather than invest in R&D.  Instead, the industry explored new R&D 
models for open innovation: models such as open-sourcing, crowd-sourcing, public-private 
partnerships, innovation centres, Science Parks, and the wholesale outsourcing of pharmaceutical 
R&D.  However, economic Greater Fool Theory suggests that outsourcing R&D was never likely to 
increase innovation.  Ten years on, the period of cheaper and softer money is coming to an end.  So 









We Outsourced R&D 
In recent years, pharmaceutical companies have turned to external sources of innovation to fuel 
their depleted R&D pipelines.  Driven by the perceived failure of Big Pharma to deliver innovative 
new products, this search included new models for open innovation: models such as open-sourcing, 
crowd-sourcing, public-private partnerships, innovation centres, Science Parks, and the wholesale 
outsourcing of pharmaceutical R&D (1) (2). With their lower cost base, these new players – more 
entrepreneurial, less risk-averse than the established players – promised a new era of cheaper, more 
efficient, more innovative R&D.  
We are now ten years into the virtualization of pharmaceutical research and development. The 
recent IQVIA Report (3) on The Global Use of Medicine in 2019 and Outlook to 2023: Forecasts and 
Areas to Watch highlights the increasing role of smaller emerging bio-pharma companies in the R&D 
supply chain (4).   So, how well are we doing?  Are we really seeing the expected rise in innovation?  
Will the hoped-for improvements in R&D productivity sufficient to secure future earnings?  And, 
what happens next? 
 
Follow the Money 
Do Big Investors Believe in Big Pharma? 
While there is still optimism in some corners, the early signs are not great. R&D productivity 
continues to decline, investors have seen a continued fall in returns on their investments, and we 
have seen a notable slow-down in annual growth especially in Europe and Japan (5) (6) (7) (8).  The 
industry may not be in a complete state of terminal decline; the more optimistic point out that 
current profits have always been more likely to be derived from mainly older products (3) (7).  
However, despite its proponents, the big investors seem unconvinced that Big Pharma, with its 
largely outsourced model of innovation, offers the prospect of significant future returns.   
Investors currently favour other technologies over pharmaceuticals.  Apple, Alphabet, Microsoft, 
Amazon and Facebook are collectively worth $3.3 trillion – more than three times the collective 
worth of the Top 21 Pharmaceutical Companies (9).  Right now, we have a company that streams 
music that is far more valuable than any pharmaceutical company.  This suggests that the markets, 
for one, are not massively optimistic about the prospective returns from the outsourcing of 
pharmaceutical R&D.  So, what is going on?  
  




The Global Financial Crisis  
The Rise of Cheap and Soft Money 
Innovation through the development of new drugs and treatments is key to the return of capital to 
owners and investors in Big Pharma.  However, the ability of R&D to innovate can only be funded by 
current profits, retained profits, or new investors.  This leads to tension.  Managing the trade-off 
between a) returning capital to owners and investors as a reward for their investment, and b) 
securing future earnings through R&D is a critical requirement for long-term market success.   
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007–2008 led to a fall in interest rates.  The cost of borrowing 
went down.  Fearing economic stagnation, the central banks released money into the economy.  By 
2016, the central banks of the United States, Japan, Europe and the UK had created over $9 trillion 
of money.   The economic decline post-GFC meant an increase in the availability of cheap money (at 
a lower interest rate – see Box 1). 
Faced with historically low capital costs following the GFC, the pharmaceutical industry had the 
option to use this cheap money to invest in future returns through increased R&D spending.  
Instead, they chose to pay down existing debt by buying back shares.  In 2017 alone, 13 of those Top 
21 Pharmaceutical Companies returned over $50 billion to their shareholders in the form of share 
buy backs (9).  Of course, buying back shares also reduces cash holdings – helping to ward off hedge 
funds and asset strippers for example – but using cheap money to return capital to shareholders has 
been a systemic feature of the last ten years (10).   
In addition, the GFC meant an influx of soft money – where risk is priced lower.  Fearing economic 
stagnation, governments made more money available through seeding initiatives, innovation grants, 
and support to smaller, entrepreneurial start-ups.   With capital from the shadow-banking sector, 
this cheaper, softer money found its way to outsourced innovators.  The economic pendulum was 
already swinging away from investing in R&D to outsourcing R&D and acquisitions.  Ostensibly, there 
was a good, sound rationale for this.  Big Pharma was seen as poor at innovation.  At the same time, 
entrepreneurs saw the availability of funds increase and the costs of those funds fell.  
So, what about these smaller, more entrepreneurial players, how have they fared?  This is where the 
new innovation is meant to come from?  Isn’t it?  Will the availability of cheap money from the 
banks and soft money to support small start-ups from government, together with more measured 
pharmaceutical investment in the Science Parks, come good?  Are we about to see the spectacular 
innovations needed to fuel the Big Pharma pipelines?   
The smart money suggests not.  There have been a number of high profile success stories – small 
start-ups that became ‘unicorns’, privately held companies worth more than US$1B.  There are other 
start-ups, acquired by large pharmaceutical companies with massive rewards to the founders and 
investors.  But the truth is on the whole more prosaic.  Most start-ups fail: turkeys rather than 
unicorns.  And, in contrast with smart money, softer, cheaper money distorts the markets, 
permitting smaller start-ups to continue failing for longer.   So, what to do? 
 
INSERT BOX 1  






Open the Box 
Progression Bias Kills Innovation 
Drug development is essentially a highly stochastic process (11) (12).  Essentially, in R&D, we ship 
boxes along the development pipeline.  Each box may, or may not, contain a marketable product.  At 
each stage in the development process, we either bin the box or pass it down the line.  As we move 
through the development process, the conditional probability that our box contains a marketable 
drug may increase.  In early development, there may be a 5% chance that our drug will pass all of the 
hurdles and make it to market.  By Phase 2 the probability that our box contains a marketable drug 
may have increased to, say, a 50% chance.  But, like Schrödinger’s cat, it is not until we actually open 
the box at the end of the process that we know for sure whether the contents of our box are alive or 
dead.  Without marketing authorization approval, our drug is dead.  
INSERT BOX 2 
The problem with stochastic processes is that they behave in unexpected ways.  A good example is 
the Development Speed Paradox (13).  This is the observation that increasing development speed by 
reducing the cycle time of successful molecules may INCREASE the expected time to first marketing 
authorization approval (see Box 2).  Conversely, building opportunities to fail unmarketable 
molecules earlier in the development process – ‘fast-fail’ or ‘quick-kill’ strategies – will shorten the 
time to first marketing authorization approval (11) (12) (14).  
How does this arise?  
With high-risk, stochastic processes such as drug development, the key to increased productivity is 
to terminate failing projects quickly in order to free up the pipeline to evaluate more viable targets 
(11) (14).  When development resources are constrained, failing compounds rapidly clog the 
pipeline, preventing the evaluation of perfectly viable products.  By focusing on the small minority of 
molecules that make it to market, the development speed initiatives of the 90s saw R&D 
productivity fall at a time when drug development cycle times halved (13).  The effect was to reduce 
pharmaceutical R&D productivity.  The pipeline becomes choked with dead and dying cats.  The 
solution is to kill failing projects quickly (15).  This sounds bad – failure has such negative 
connotations – but killing failing projects means we avoid incurring the opportunity costs of 
progression bias (14).  And progression bias – the reluctance to terminate failing projects quickly – is 
at the heart of the problem (16).   
Large pharmaceutical companies are notoriously bad at terminating failing projects (16).   Ironically, 
this made the outsourcing of pharmaceutical R&D an attractive proposition.  Recognizing that their 
in-house programmes were prone to progression bias, R&D was outsourced in the belief that other 
companies would be better at making those decisions.  It is a good, sound rationale for the 
outsourcing of pharmaceutical innovation.  It has just one tiny little problem.  That’s not how 
economics works. 
 







Greater Fools and Ruthless Rules 
The reality TV program ‘Shark Tank’ – ‘Dragon’s Den’ in the EU, or ‘Tigers of Money’ in Japan – allows 
entrepreneurs to pitch business ideas to potential investors.  The entrepreneurs make business 
presentations to a panel of five investors – the ’sharks’, ‘dragons’ or ‘tigers’ of the title - who decide 
whether to invest in the company.  The sharks often find weaknesses and faults in an entrepreneur's 
concept, product, or business model.   The entrepreneur can make a handshake deal on the show if 
a panel member is interested.  However, the entrepreneur may be savaged during question time.  
And if all of the panel members opt out, the entrepreneur leaves empty-handed.  While the sharks 
are paid as cast stars of the show, the money they invest is their own money.  The sharks are 
experienced investors, their risk assessments sound, and their valuations of that risk accurate.  Our 
sharks are ruthless.  Accordingly, their investments are good, sound, rational investments accurately 
reflecting the risks and likely value of the proposed business.   
However, in reality, investments do not need to accurately reflect risk and value in order to be 
considered rational. 
In economics, Greater Fool Theory states that the price of an object is determined not by its intrinsic 
value, but rather by the, possibly irrational, beliefs and expectations of market participants (17).  
Thus a price can be justified by a rational buyer under the belief that another party is willing to pay 
an even higher price.  In other words, one may pay a price that seems "foolishly" high because, quite 
rationally, one may have the expectation that the item can be resold to a "greater fool" later.  
Unfortunately, the search for a “greater fool” creates a culture where progression bias is more, 
rather than less, likely.   
In drug development, our goal should be to terminate failing projects as quickly as possible.  
Outsourcing innovation to smaller players – with the intent of acquiring the more successful ones – 
was seen as a way to sort the wheat from the chaff.  However, with few drugs, or in some cases a 
single drug, progression bias is likely to be stronger in smaller start-ups (18).  Often, for start-ups, 
venture capitalists and the shadow banks that made initial investments, the ultimate goal is to sell 
the start-up.  In the search for a Greater Fool, a rational strategy for the seller is to downplay the 
risks, and overestimate the value.  As a result, the strategic objectives of small start-ups and Big 
Pharma may not be fully aligned.   
So, as the era of cheaper money and softer money comes to an end, who will be the survivors and 
who will fall by the wayside? 
  






‘New Wave’ Mergers and Acquisitions 
The evidence to support improved R&D productivity through outsourcing to smaller, more agile 
start-ups is still rather weak.  If outsourcing innovation has relied on softer, cheaper money that 
does not reflect the true risks, what happens when the money dries up?  The threat to global R&D 
may be significant – see Figure 1.  And the nature of global capital structures means that this would 
likely be felt, at least initially, outside of the USA. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
One, perhaps unlikely, response is that we will see no change in behaviour – progression bias and 
the search for the greater fool will triumph.  As sources of cheaper, softer money dry up, the 
industry enters a period of terminal decline.   
Alternatively, Big Pharma might seek to realign the goals of the smaller players with those of Big 
Pharma.  This may require longer-term relationships with those smaller R&D innovators.  The key 
will be to establish effective management systems permitting those innovators to continue to do 
what they do best without carrying too much corporate ballast.  For Big Pharma, learning to live with 
cultural diversity may be critical to longer-term survival.   
In addition, there may be a rebound effect with Big Pharma seeking to bring R&D back “into the 
tent”.  Internal R&D investment can only take place at the cost of returning less funds to investors.  
This may depress the value of some companies, triggering a new round of acquisitions and mergers 
among the bigger players.  Those leading the changes will need to consider carefully whether the 
need for cultural alignment across the organization merits the threat it presents to innovators and 
innovative thinking.  Old fashioned, cultural alignment, or “corporate homogenization” initiatives 
characteristic of previous mega-mergers are unlikely to work.  Instead we are likely to witness a 
round of less aggressive, or ‘New Wave’, mergers and acquisitions supporting innovative cultural 
diversity, characterized by a minimum of cultural disruption.   
As the tide of softer, cheaper money recedes and the under-pricing of risk in R&D comes to an end, 
the pressures to reduce progression bias will increase.  The future may still be promising for those 
survivors who manage their internal and external discovery pipelines well: those with a light touch 
who have learned to terminate failing projects quickly.   
  






The Future is Interesting 
The outsourcing of pharmaceutical innovation  - open-sourcing, crowd-sourcing, public-private 
partnerships, innovation centres, Science Parks  - was positioned as a response to the perceived 
failure of pharmaceutical research and development to innovate and improve R&D productivity.  It 
was facilitated by the sudden availability of softer, cheaper money from banks, governments and 
institutions under-pricing R&D risk following the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-2008.  There have 
been a number of high profile success stories – those fabled unicorns capitalizing upon increased 
investment from these sources.   Ten years on, the pendulum is set to swing.  The winners will be 
those who have learned to eliminate progression bias. Those who have learned to re-frame project 











Figure 1:  The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 on the Pharmaceutical R&D 
Innovation Landscape.  Historically low interest rates meant that cheap money and soft money 
flooded the market.  Rather than use low interest rates to invest in in-house R&D, pharmaceutical 
companies sought to reduce debt and buy back shares.  At the same time, cheap money and soft 
money permitted the growth of outsourced innovation.  Unfortunately, progression bias is likely to 
be higher in these smaller companies.  Without ‘shark tank’ economics, the price is likely to be 
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